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Since the start of the European Monetary Union fiscal policy in the Euro area has been 
dominated by the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). Quite obviously the SGP has been 
unsuccessful in fulfilling its goals, fiscal sustainability and supporting economic growth. 
More and more countries have exceeded the 3 percent of GDP limit for the budget deficit, 
while at the same time macroeconomic performance has been unsatisfactory. We analyse 
fiscal policy and its macroeconomic impact for the Euro area as a whole and for selected 
countries and compare it with US fiscal policy, with a special emphasis on the period 2001-
2005. Whereas US fiscal policy has been strongly counter-cyclical, thus stabilising the 
economy, in the Euro area fiscal policy has been much more restrictive and has had pro-
cyclical and therefore destabilising effects for many countries. However, one cannot put all 
the blame on fiscal policy. The ECB’s restrictive monetary policy and divergent and 
destabilising wage developments across the Euro area are at least as important as fiscal policy 
in the explanation of the Euro area’s weak economic performance. As a possible solution for 
the future, we suggest to replace the SGP by expenditure paths as coordination tool, and we 
discuss an important modification of the concept. Such expenditure paths could co-ordinate 
fiscal policies across the Euro area in a counter-cyclical way and at the same time ensure 
fiscal sustainability. Unfortunately, as long as monetary and wage policies remain un-
coordinated and destabilising, any improvements in fiscal policy will not be very effective in 
enhancing economic performance. 
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1. Introduction  
 
Since the start of the European Monetary Union (EMU) fiscal policy in the Euro area has 
been dominated by the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). However, the SGP has been 
unsuccessful in fulfilling both of its goals, fiscal sustainability and supporting economic 
growth: In recent years, more and more countries have exceeded the 3 percent of GDP limit 
for the budget deficit. At the same time, macroeconomic performance has been unsatisfactory, 
with the Euro area economy only slowly recovering from the post-2000 stagnation. The 
prolonged stagnation as well as the ongoing fiscal problems have revived the macroeconomic 
debate on a reform of the SGP. A reform was finally introduced after a legal conflict between 
the European Commission and the European Council about the Council’s right to simply 
ignore the Commission’s recommendation to further pursue the excessive deficit procedures 
against France and Germany. However, the reform did not fundamentally change the SGP. 
Therefore, the economic and political debates on SGP reforms continue. In the current paper 
we would like to contribute to this debate. After a rather detailed account of fiscal policy 
developments and their impact on the Euro area economy, we present a modified expenditure 
path concept as an alternative to the current SGP. 
 
The paper is an extension of our earlier work, in which we tried to explain the long-run 
growth and employment differentials between the Euro area and the USA by a 
macroeconomic policy view, stressing the more restrictive stance of monetary, fiscal and 
wage policies under the ‘Maastricht Regime’.
1 We proceed as follows: Section 2 compares 
the macroeconomic performance in the Euro area and its individual member countries with 
the performance of the US economy. Section 3 provides a more detailed description of fiscal 
policies and consolidation efforts in the Euro area since 1991. In Section 4 we analyse the 
macroeconomic impact of fiscal policy and in Section 5 we will put this in a broader 
perspective discussing also monetary and wage policies. In Section 6 we comment on the 
recent modifications of the SGP and present our reform proposal based on expenditure paths. 
Section 7 points to a potential drawback by asking whether fiscal policy can really improve 
                                                           
1 See Hein/Truger (2005a, 2005b) and Hein/Niechoj (2006) on the Maastricht regime, Hein/Truger (2005c, 
2005d) on the special situation of the German economy and Hein/Truger (2006a), Hein/Schulten/Truger (2006) 
on the risks of deflation in Germany and Europe associated with this constellation. Also Fritsche et al. (2005), 
Palley (1998) and Solow (2000) have argued that a favourable coordination between monetary and fiscal policies 
rather than deregulated labour markets can be held responsible for the superior development of the US-economy 
during the 1990s compared to Germany or the EU.   2
growth and employment under the current regime of monetary and wage policies in Europe. 
Section 8 concludes. 
 
2. Unsatisfactory macroeconomic performance in the Euro area  
 
Since the growth slowdown in 2000/1 the Euro area has had a difficult time to recover and 
macroeconomic performance has been worse than in the USA. There the economy returned 
rather quickly to its impressive growth path of the late 1990s. On average over the period 
2001-2005, annual real GDP-growth in the Euro area has remained more than 1 percentage 
point below US-growth (Table 1). The growth differential, already to be found since the start 
of the convergence process towards the EMU in the mid-1990s (Hein/Niechoj 2006), seems to 
have become persistent. The unemployment rate in the Euro area is still considerably above 
the US level. Between 2001 and 2005 inflation in the Euro area has on average slightly 
exceeded the European Central Bank’s (ECB) inflation target of ‘below, but close to, 2 
percent in the medium term’ (ECB 2003: 79). But the deviation from the US inflation rate is 
rather small. Taken together, in recent years the US-economy has once more managed to 
combine reasonable growth, low unemployment and low inflation in a far better manner than 
the Euro area. 
 
Slow growth and high unemployment are by no means equally distributed across the Euro 
area (Table 1). Whereas during the period 2001-2005 in particular the large economies 
Germany and Italy, together with the Netherlands and Portugal, have been suffering from real 
GDP growth rates well below the Euro area average, Spain, Finland, Greece and Ireland have 
experienced growth considerably above this average. The unemployment rates display a wide 
dispersion across Euro area countries, too. Finally, also inflation rates show major differences 
between Euro area countries, with rates well below the ECB’s target in Germany and Finland, 
and well above the target in Spain, Greece, Ireland, the Netherlands and Portugal. 
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percent 2.6 2.2
Table 1: Real GDP growth, growth contributions of demand aggregates, unemployment rate and inflation rate in the Euro area countries, 
average values for 2001-2005*
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0.7 1.6 0.6 3.1 1.5 1.5 2.3 4.4 4.6 0.9 0.6
-0.2 2.0 1.0 4.2 0.7 1.4 2.3 4.5 3.0 0.5 0.5
0.2 1.1 0.3 2.0 0.6 0.6 1.6 2.7 1.9 0.2 0.9
0.0 0.5 0.4 0.8 0.1 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.4
-0.4 0.3 0.3 1.4 0.0 0.4 0.4 1.4 1.4 -0.1 -0.7
0.9 -0.4 -0.4 -1.1 0.8 0.1 0.0 -0.1 1.6 0.4 0.1
-0.2 0.5 1.2 2.9 0.2 0.5 0.9 1.3 2.9 0.0 0.4
8.7 9.2 8.4 10.5 4.4 7.8 8.9 10.2 4.4 3.6 5.9
1.4 1.6 2.0 2.4
1 USA: national CPI, 
2 Euro area: HCPI.
Source: Eurostat; authors’ calculations; U.S. inflation rate: Reuters Eco Win.
3.2 3.5 3.4 2.8 3.2 1.9 2.0
 
 
3. Maastricht, the SGP, and fiscal consolidation in the Euro area-countries since 1991 
 
Since the early 1990s fiscal policy in the Euro area has been dominated by the Treaty of 
Maastricht and since the start of the Euro in 1999 by the Amsterdam SGP (European 
Commission 2002). As conditions of entry to the monetary union, the Maastricht Treaty set a 
maximum deficit ratio (proportion of current budget deficit in relation to GDP) of 3 percent 
and a maximum debt ratio (proportion of public debt in relation to GDP) of 60 percent. In 
1997, the SGP made this regulation even tougher by prescribing for the medium term, i.e. a 
time span which stretches across economic cycles, balanced budgets or budget surpluses in 
order to reduce the level of debt.
2 Achieving these conditions was intended, on the one hand, 
to enable the automatic stabilisers to work during economic downturns without violating the 3 
percent deficit criterion. On the other hand, it should ensure the long run sustainability of 
public finances. Especially, it was intended to create leeway for possible future funding 
objectives which may arise from demographic developments such as social security provision 
for the elderly. 
   4
The SGP requires member states to present annual stability programmes to the European 
Commission, which describe how they intend to achieve balanced budgets, and which can be 
employed as an advance notice when a country is approaching the 3 percent limit for its 
current budget deficit. If this mark is exceeded, the ‘excessive deficit procedure’ (EDP) is 
applied (EC Treaty, Art. 104). If the country is not in a deep recession, defined as an annual 
real GDP shrinkage of more than 2 percent, and if the country in question refuses to introduce 
consolidation measures, penalties of up to 0.5 percent of GDP per year may ultimately be 
incurred. In spring 2005 the SGP has been modified so as to mitigate the strictness of the 
excessive deficit procedure somewhat. In Section 6 we turn to a more detailed description and 
evaluation of these modifications which have not questioned the substance of the original 
SGP. 
 
With respect to deficit reduction, fiscal policy has been rather successful (Figure 1, Table 2). 
For the Euro area as a whole the buget balance was reduced from an average -5.1 percent of 
GDP in the first half of the 1990s to -2.3 percent in the second half. After the economic 
slowdown in 2000/2001 the buget balance has decreased again, but on average for the period 
2001 to 2005 to only -2.6 percent of GDP. There seems to have been a permanent 
improvement in the bugdet balance of about 2.5 percentage points. The cost of this deficit 
reduction in terms of a loss in public goods provision or in higher taxes is considerably 
smaller. The primary budget balance, i.e. net lending excluding net government interest 
payments, had to be improved by only 2 percentage points for the second half of the 1990s 
and by 0.5 percentage points for the period from 2001 to 2005. The substantially lower 
average interest burden of public debt is at least partly due to the remarkable reduction in the 
average long term nominal interest rates which was caused by the rapid interest rate 
convergence towards the lower German level. In that respect fiscal policy obviously gained 
from the common currency. Similar tendencies with respect to public deficit reduction can be 
found for most of the single member countries, albeit to quite different extents (Table 2). 
Belgium, Finland, Greece, Italy and Spain stand out with particularly large deficit reductions 
above 5 percentage points. Together with Portugal – and with the exception of Finland – these 
are also the countries that gained the most from falling interest rates. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
2 See Allsopp/Vines (1998), Arestis et al. (2001), Eichengreen (1998) and Semmler (2000) for a more detailed 
analysis of the original SGP.   5
Fiscal policy has been rather unsuccessful in stabilising the gross debt-GDP-ratio (Table 3). 
For the Euro area as a whole this ratio went up from an average 65.5 percent of GDP in the 
first half of the 1990s to 73.5 percent in the second half. From 2001 to 2005 the average level 
was somewhat lower (69.5 percent), but still above the 60 percent upper limit of the 
Maastricht Treaty and the SGP. The most important reason for this development is certainly 
that France and Germany as the two largest Euro area economies both increased their gross 
public debt-GDP-ratio by almost 15 percentage points. After all, six countries managed to 
reduce their gross indebtedness noticeably. 
 
Figure 1: Government budget balance and primary budget balance: 
Euro area 1991-2005 in % of  GDP
Source: Eurostat; primary lending: OECD (2005). Budget balances 2000-2002 corrected for 
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Many countries did not succeed in complying with the deficit rules of the SGP (see Table 4). 
Over the last four years, for the Euro area as a whole the deficit ratio has been close to the 3 
percent limit within a narrow band between 2.4 and 3.0 percent of GDP. Since the start of the 
EMU, six out of twelve member countries have exceeded the 3 percent limit of the SGP, with 
the exception of the Netherlands all of them three times or more. 
   6
1991-1995 1996-2000 2001-2005 1991-1995 1996-2000 2001-2005
Austria -4.0 -2.5 -1.0 -1.0 0.5 1.4
Belgium -6.3 -1.3 0.1 3.5 5.9 5.3
Finland -4.6 1.3 3.2 -5.2 2.8 3.4
France -4.6 -2.6 -3.2 -1.9 0.2 -0.7
Germany -2.8 -2.2 -3.6 -0.1 0.8 -1.0
Greece -11.2 -5.2 -5.7 0.5 3.6 0.0
Ireland -2.5 2.1 0.2 2.3 4.2 0.4
Italy -9.9 -3.3 -3.4 1.7 4.6 1.6
Netherlands -3.3 -0.3 -1.8 1.0 3.6 0.3
Portugal -6.5 -3.4 -3.8 0.8 0.3 -0.9
Spain -5.6 -2.5 -0.1 -1.4 1.3 2.0
Euro area -5.1 -2.3 -2.6 -0.2 1.9 0.4
USA -4.5 0.0 -3.5 -1.0 3.0 -1.5
Note: Balances 2000-2002 are corrected for proceeds from UMTS auctions.
Source: OECD (2005); authors’ calculations. 
Table 2: Average government budget balance and primary budget balance for the Euro area countries and the USA from 1991 
to 2005 in percent of GDP




Austria 60.7 65.8 64.8
Belgium 134.1 119.7 99.5
Finland 46.8 50.3 42.9
France 44.7 58.2 61.7
Germany 47.3 60.6 63.4
Greece 99.3 108.9 109.8
Ireland 90.9 55.7 31.2
Italy 115.3 117.4 106.2
Netherlands 77.5 66.2 51.9
Portugal 60.1 56.9 57.7
Spain 54.9 64.7 49.5
Euro area 65.5 73.5 69.5
USA 74.5 67.3 62.5
Table 3: Gross government debt for the Euro area countries and the USA from 1991 to 2005 in 
percent of GDP in percent of GDP
Source: Eurostat; values for USA: European Commission (2005) and authors’ calculations.  
 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
France 3.2 4.2 3.7
Germany 3.7 4.0 3.7 3.3
Greece 4.1 6.0 4.9 5.8 6.9 4.5
Italy 3.2 3.4 3.4 4.1
Netherlands 3.1
Portugal 4.2 3.2 6.0
Table 4: Excessive deficits in Euro area countries from 2000 to 2005 in percent of 
GDP
Source: Eurostat.    7
 
4. The macroeconomic impact of fiscal policy 
 
In order to take account of the macroeconomic impact of fiscal policy it is not sufficient to 
look at the development of actual deficits, as in the previous section. Actual deficits may 
simply reflect the underlying economic situation and not active fiscal policy. Therefore, we 
assess the extent to which fiscal policy exerts a stabilising or destabilising influence on the 
business cycle by comparing changes in the output gap and the cyclically adjusted budget 
balance-potential GDP ratio (CBR), using the relevant values from the OECD Economic 
Outlook (OECD 2005).
3 The output gap serves as an indicator of the current state of 
economic activity. If it is positive, capacity is outstripped, if it is negative, capacity is not 
fully utilised. Consequently, a positive change in the output gap indicates a cyclical upturn, 
whereas a negative change points to a cyclical downturn. If there is a positive (negative) 
change in the CBR, then structural deficits fall (rise) or structural surpluses rise (fall), and 
fiscal policy provides a restrictive (expansive) stimulus to demand. If the CBR remains 
constant in the face of a changing output gap, fiscal policy is neither expansive nor restrictive 
and the automatic stabilisers are simply left to take effect. 
 
Such cyclically adjusted measures can be criticised for a number of theoretical and empirical 
reasons and should therefore be interpreted with great care. Theoretically, they are very close 
to the idea embedded in the standard NAIRU models: There is a long-run equilibrium, 
determined by structural characteristics of the labour market, which is independent of the 
short-run fluctuations generated by demand shocks or macroeconomic policy. We do not 
share this view (Hein 2004, 2006a, 2006b). Empirically, these measures are very sensitive to 
the exact method used and to the choice of observation period. The separation of a cyclical 
from a potential or trend component can be biased because the potential component may be 
endogenous. After some years of high (low) growth caused by ‘short-term’ demand side 
measures or shocks, the potential or trend growth will go up (down) thereby underestimating 
the cyclical component compared to a situation without such demand side measures or 
shocks. Therefore, the cyclically adjusted budget deficits (surpluses) for low (high) growth 
countries may be considerably overestimated. Despite these serious problems we consider the 
measures as useful. First, the OECD numbers we have used have proven to be less susceptible 
to the endogeneity bias than, for example, the values published by the European Commission 
                                                           
3 For a detailed exposition of the methods used by the OECD see Giorno et al. (1995).   8
(2005). Second, if certain empirical findings about the stabilising or destabilising effects of 
fiscal policy can be derived within such a mainstream framework, then this rather strengthens 
the point from a heterodox perspective.
4
 
Measured in the way described, fiscal policy in the Euro area as a whole from 1991 to 2005 
developed as follows (Figure 2): In a first rather long phase from 1991 to 1999 fiscal policy 
was strongly restrictive with average annual improvements in the CBR of more than 0.5 
percentage points. Especially at the beginning of the 1990s, fiscal policy went through a 
seriously pro-cyclical episode because it decreased structural deficits despite a sharp fall in 
the output gap. From 1999 to 2000 fiscal policy switched to pro-cyclical expansion in the 
peak of the 2000 boom. From 2000 to 2002 it counter-cyclically stabilised the Euro area 
economy after the slowdown in 2000/2001. Finally, from 2002 until today, fiscal policy has 
had a destabilising effect because the CBR has been slightly increased despite the continuing 
slowdown. This general picture – strong restriction over the 1990s, loosening at the end of the 
1990s, short counter-cyclical reaction after the 2000/2001 slowdown, and a pro-cyclical 
stance in the present economic downturn – applies to almost all of the individual Euro area 
countries. With respect to the extent and the exact timing, there are some substantial 
differences across the countries, though. 
 
The course of fiscal policy in the Euro area is in remarkable contrast to that in the USA 
(Figure 3). There, after a strong counter-cyclical stabilisation effort in the recession 1990/91, 
fiscal policy changed to a clearly counter-cyclical path of strong restriction during the 
upswing until the peak of the boom in 2000. After the sharp downturn in 2000/2001, fiscal 
policy once again reacted in a strongly counter-cyclical way, decreasing the CBR by more 
than 5 percentage points from 2000 to 2004. From the empirical evidence over the whole 
period, therefore, it must be concluded that fiscal policy in the USA has played its 
macroeconomic stabilisation role properly, whereas in the Euro area fiscal policy has acted in 
an often pro-cylical and therefore destabilising way 
                                                           
4 Of course, the results for a given set of countries and a given time period should be more or less robust to the 
method used and to additional observations due to new data over time. At least with regard to the latter and for 
Germany, the Euro area and the US most of the qualitative results we obtain have proven to be rather robust to 
new data, as we conducted this kind of analysis with almost every new edition of the OECD Economic Outlook 
data since 2001 (see Hein/Muelhaupt/Truger 2001, Hein/Truger 2005a, 2005b, 2005c, 2005d, Truger/Hein 
2002).   9
Figure 2: Government budget balance, cyclically adjusted budget balance 
and output gap: Euro area 1991-2005 in % of (pot.) GDP 
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Figure 3: Government budget balance, cyclically adjusted budget balance 
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budget balance budget balance (cycl. Adj.) output gap    10
 
This result is reinforced by the developments in the recent economic slowdown from 2001 to 
2005 (Table 5). In the face of an average annual fall in the output gap of 0.6 percent of GDP, 
Euro area fiscal policy was only slightly expansive with an average annual decrease in the 
CBR of 0.1 percentage points. However, almost the total expansive, counter-cyclical reaction 
occurred in 2001, when the fall in the output gap was small (Figure 2). In 2002 fiscal 
expansion was hardly measurable and since 2003, fiscal policy has even been slightly pro-
cyclically restrictive. The cumulated negative fiscal stimulus over the last three years has 
amounted to 0.5 percent of GDP.  
 
For the individual Euro area countries the picture is rather diverse (Table 5). However, there 
has not been a single country that did not see a pro-cyclically restrictive fiscal policy in at 
least one year during the recent slowdown. Over the whole period from 2001 to 2005, fiscal 
policy was strongly expansive in only two countries: The high growth countries Finland and 
Ireland both decreased their average annual CBRs by 0.8 percentage points. Four countries, 
namely Italy, Greece, France and Germany saw a slightly expansive fiscal policy over the 
whole period with their CBRs decreasing by 0.3, 0.2, 0.1 and 0.1 percentage points 
respectively. In Greece the fiscal expansion turned out to be pro-cyclical, as the output gap 
improved at the same time. The precise pattern in that country, however, was of a stop and go 
nature. In France fiscal policy reacted in a really counter-cyclical way against the fall in the 
output gap from 2000 to 2003. After 2004 it switched to restriction and became noticeably 
pro-cyclical in 2005. In Italy, almost all of the expansion occurred from 2000 to 2001, when 
the output gap was still slightly improving. From 2002 to 2004, however, when the output gap 
worsened considerably, fiscal policy was pro-cyclical, before once more turning to expansion 
in 2005. In Germany, virtually all of the expansion occurred in 2001 with only a minor 
worsening of the output gap. In 2002 German fiscal policy was neutral in the face of a strong 
fall in the output gap. Since 2003 it has pro-cyclically tightened despite further substantial 
drops in the output gap. In the five remaining countries, Spain, Austria, Belgium, the 
Netherlands and Portugal, fiscal policy was pro-cyclically restrictive over the whole period 
from 2001 to 2005. Whereas in Spain both the drop in the output gap as well as the negative 
pro-cyclical fiscal stimulus has been comparatively small, both values have been substantial 
in the other countries. In Portugal and Austria the cumulated negative pro-cyclical fiscal 
stimulus from 2001 to 2005 amounted to 3.8 and 3.0 percent of GDP, respectively. In striking 
contrast to the European experience, US fiscal policy from 2001 to 2005 was very expansive   11
with an average annual decrease in the CBR of 0.9 percent (Table 5). There has not been a 
single year with pro-cyclical fiscal restriction during the economic downturn. Since 2005, the 
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Table 5: Indicators for fiscal policy in the Euro area countries and the USA, average values, 2001-2005*
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Therefore, it is hard to escape the conclusion, that the SGP did lead to destabilising, pro-
cyclical fiscal policy reactions to the post-2000 crisis in several countries. With the exception 
of Greece and to some extent also France, all the countries with excessive deficit problems 
stopped their initially expansive fiscal policy and were driven into pro-cyclical, restrictive 
measures as soon as their deficit had reached the 3 percent of GDP limit. Without doubt, the 
resulting negative fiscal stance has contributed to the ongoing stagnation tendencies after 
2000 within these countries and in the Euro area as a whole. Of course, fiscal policy is only 
one factor in the explanation of macroeconomic performance. However, with respect to GDP 
growth it is striking that all of the four countries with below Euro area average growth rates 
(Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Portugal) suffered from inadequately restrictive fiscal 
policies. And from the four countries with above average growth rates, after all three 
countries (Ireland, Finland and Greece) had expansive fiscal policies.  
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It is sometimes argued that the countries with excessive deficits might have avoided their 
problems and the ensuing pro-cyclical fiscal policy if they had pursued a tighter fiscal policy 
during ‘good times’. At the first sight this argument has some appeal as most of the countries 
in question had at least one short episode of pro-cyclical expansion at the end of the 1990s or 
in 2000. However, stronger fiscal restriction could have meant some damage. As a rough 
estimate suggests, in order to avoid excessive deficits and pro-cyclically restrictive policies in 
the period from 2001 to 2005, the countries concerned would have had to decrease their 
budget deficits by an additional 2 to 4 percent of GDP within only 2 or 3 years. Moreover, the 
restriction would have hit the economies in a situation in which they were just recovering 
from the early and mid-1990s stagnation with a prolonged period of tight and often pro-
cyclical fiscal policies. Without doubt, the ‘good times’ would have been turned into ‘bad 
times’ by such a policy. As the ultimate retreat proponents of tighter fiscal policy might 
question that restrictive fiscal policy causes any demand side problems, at all, due to ‘non-
Keynesian effects’ of fiscal consolidation (see e.g. Alesina Perotti 1996). However, it has 
convincingly been argued that such a position cannot be defended in any sensible way (see 
e.g. Arestis/Sawyer 2003). 
 
5. The macroeconomic impact of monetary policy and wage developments 
 
Macroeconomic performance cannot be explained solely by fiscal policy but has also to take 
into account monetary and wage policies. Monetary policy can be assessed by the 
development of the short-term real interest rate. It is now widely accepted that modern central 
banks use the short-term nominal interest rate as an economic policy instrument. If central 
banks target inflation they have to set nominal interest rates with an eye to the ensuing real 
rate, as proposed in the famous Taylor-rule, for example (Taylor 1993). In order to take into 
account the underlying economic situation, we consult the differences between both the short- 
and long-term real interest rate and real GDP-growth. We expect a negative influence of real 
interest rates on economic growth working through different transmission channels (money, 
credit, asset prices, exchange rates) (Bernanke/Gertler 1995, Cecchetti 1995). 
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Figure 4: Short-term real interest rate minus real GDP 
growth in the Euro area and the USA, 
1992-2005, percentage points 




































































Whereas the Euro area short-term real interest rate was positive on average over the period 
after the 2000/1 growth slowdown, the Federal Reserve (Fed) managed to establish a negative 
short-term real interest rate of -0.2 percent in the USA (Table 6). These expansionary 
monetary policies contributed to the quick recovery of the US economy. The USA returned to 
a negative short-term real interest rate-real GDP growth rate-difference already in 2002, 
whereas in the Euro area this difference became negative only in 2003 (Figure 4). On average 
over the recent years, the Fed has established a favourable short-term real interest rate-real 
GDP growth-difference (-2.7 percentage points), and also a growth-friendly long-term real 
interest rate-real GDP growth constellation (-0.7 percentage points). By contrast, in the Euro 
area the short-term real interest rate-real GDP growth-difference has been only slightly 
negative (-0.8 percentage point) on average over the period 2001-2005. The long-term real 
interest rate-real GDP growth-difference has even been positive (0.7 percentage points). The 
ECB has been reluctant to stimulate the economy by cutting interest rates in the face of the 
slowdown.  
   14
USA
Euro 




Short-term real interest 
rate,
percent
Long-term real interest 
rate, 
percent
Short-term real interest 
rate minus real GDP 
growth,
percentage points
Long-term real interest 





per employee, annual 
growth,
percent







Change in labour income 
share to previous year,
percentage points -0.6
Notes: *Forecast values for 2005, 
#compensation per employee divided by GDP at current market prices per person employed.
Sources: European Commission (2005), OECD (2005), authors’ calculations.
0.5 -0.2 -0.2 0.0 0.2 -0.5 -0.6 -0.2 -0.4 -0.2 -0.5 0.0
58.0 47.8 59.2 63.0
2.1
62.6 58.0 58.1 57.4 55.6 57.1 62.5 61.7 55.6
1 . 83 . 33 . 32 . 7 3.2 2.9 0.8 1.8 1.7 1.7 0.3 1.7
6.5 5.7 3.9 2.3
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Table 6: Indicators for monetary and wage policies in the Euro area countries and in the USA, average values, 2001-2005*
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ECB policy has been particularly harmful for the largest Euro area member country, Germany 
(Table 6). As the German inflation rate has been lower than the EMU average and the 
nominal interest rates have almost completely converged since 1999, Germany’s real interest 
rates have even been higher than the Euro area average since then. This has contributed to an 
unfavourable short-term real interest rate-real GDP growth-difference. Germany was the only 
member country in which that difference was positive on average over the period 2001-2005. 
On the other hand, the high inflation countries Spain, Greece and Ireland have had negative 
short-term real interest rates and a very growth favourable constellation with negative 
differences between both the short- and long-term real interest rate and real GDP growth. 
 
Therefore, the ECB’s ‘anti-growth-bias’, i.e. a too restrictive definition of price stability for 
the heterogeneous currency area - as an annual increase of the harmonised consumer price 
index of below but close to 2 percent (ECB 2003: 79) - and an asymmetric response to the   15
expected deviation of actual from target inflation,
5 has contributed to the weak growth and 
employment performance of the Euro area as a whole and to the economic problems of the 
largest Euro area member, Germany, in particular. However, it has to be conceded that the 
ECB cannot react directly towards the inflation differences between Euro area member 
countries. This is where wage policies become relevant. 
 
Wage policies can be assessed by nominal wage growth (compensation per employee), unit 
labour cost growth and the labour income share. Nominal wage setting affects unit labour cost 
growth and inflation. If nominal wages increase at a faster pace than productivity plus the 
price level do, unit labour cost growth and inflation will speed up.
6  This will cause real 
interest rates to fall. If nominal wages increase at a rate below the sum of productivity growth 
and inflation, unit labour cost growth will slow down and cause disinflation. Finally, deflation 
may be the consequence. Deflation causes increasing real interest rates and rising real debts 
with potentially negative effects on investment and growth.
7 Once deflationary processes have 
started, monetary policies lowering nominal interest rates will be ineffective. 
 
Wage policies, however, may not only affect prices, but may also change distribution if firms 
do not completely pass unit labour cost variations to prices or if prices of other inputs do not 
change in step with unit labour costs. Under these conditions nominal wage moderation 
causes the labour income share to fall (Hein/Schulten/Truger 2006). Theoretically, the effects 
of income shares on GDP growth are ambiguous (Bhaduri/Marglin 1990). With the 
propensity to save out of wages falling short of the savings propensity out of profits, a falling 
labour income share means a cut-back in consumption demand and capacity utilisation with 
directly contractive effects on investment and GDP growth. A fall in labour income shares 
that is associated with nominal wage restraint would, on the other hand, improve international 
competitiveness and, therefore, stimulate export demand, investment and growth. With a 
slowdown in inflation, the central bank may also cut interest rates and stimulate investment 
and growth. Finally, a falling labour income share is associated with rising unit profits which 
may also improve investment and growth.  
                                                           
5 The ECB has tended to tighten whenever inflation increased above the target without relaxing when inflation 
expectations came down. For a general critique of the ECB’s ‘anti-growth bias’ see Bibow (2002, 2005a, 2005b) 
Hein (2002) and Hein/Truger (2006b). 
6 See Arestis/Sawyer (2005) and Hein (2006a) for recent post-Keynesian models of distribution conflict and 
inflation. 
7 See Hein (2006a, 2006b) for the integration of real debt effects into Kaleckian models of distribution and 
growth with conflict inflation.   16
 
Since the stimulating effects of wage moderation and declining labour income shares for 
investment and growth are rather indirect and uncertain, in particular in large and rather 
closed economies as the Euro area and the USA, the direct and contractive effects will 
presumably dominate here. And since nominal wage increases, which will shift distribution in 
favour of labour income, will also trigger inflation and concomitant restrictive central bank 
interventions, nominal wage growth according to the sum of long-run productivity growth and 
the central bank’s inflation target and hence roughly stable labour income shares should be 
generally favourable for growth and employment in large and rather closed currency areas. 
 
On average over the period 2001-2005, nominal wage growth in the Euro area has been 
lagging behind the USA (Table 6). But taking into account productivity growth, nominal 
wage increases in both currency areas have been stability oriented: nominal unit labour costs 
have grown by 1.7 percent and have hence not caused any inflationary pressures. Moderate 
wage increases were accompanied by a decline in the labour income share, both in the Euro 
area and in the USA. Whereas in the USA this decline compensated for the increase in the 
previous years generating a stationary trend since the early 1990s, in the Euro area the recent 
decline has continued the decreasing trend since the early 1990s. Although labour income 
shares in the two economies had similar levels in the early 1990s, the Euro area value is by 
now 4 percentage points below the US-value contributing to domestic demand problems in 
Europe. 
 
Below the surface of Euro area aggregate values there is a wide dispersion of wages and 
nominal unit labour cost growth rates (Table 6). In Italy, Spain, Greece, Ireland and the 
Netherlands nominal unit labour costs have grown at rates around 3 percent on average 
between 2001 and 2005 which interfered with the ECB’s overly ambitious inflation target. 
Nominal unit labour costs in Germany, however, and to a lesser extent in Austria, have grown 
at especially low rates causing deflationary risks, which have been accompanied by a rapid 
decline in labour income shares contributing to domestic demand problems. Especially wage 
developments in Germany have been completely inappropriate for the largest economy in a 
currency union:
8 Overly moderate wage policies have improved price competitiveness and 
profitability of German firms and have made German export surpluses almost quadruple 
between 2001 and 2005. Since around 44 percent of German exports go to the Euro area,   17
increasing German export surpluses cause major problems for the other Euro area countries. 
Whereas Germany has continuously increased its current account surplus, amounting to 4.1 
percent of GDP in 2005, the other larger Euro area countries (France, Italy, Spain) are 
increasingly driven into current account deficits (Table 7). Some of the smaller countries 
either see their surpluses decline (Belgium, Finland) or cannot decrease their huge deficits 
(Greece, Portugal). If this constellation persists it will inevitably induce the other Euro area 
countries to use deflationary wage policies as well. The risk of deflation will then spread 
across the Euro area. 
 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Germany 0.2 2.3 2.2 3.8 4.1
France 1.6 0.9 0.4 -0.4 -1.6
Italy -0.1 -0.8 -1.3 -0.9 -1.5
Spain -3.9 -3.3 -3.6 -5.3 -7.7
Austria -1.9 0.3 -0.5 0.3 -0.4
Belgium 3.4 4.6 4.1 3.3 1.4
Finland 7.2 7.6 3.8 5.3 3.5
Greece -8.1 -7.5 -7.2 -6.3 -7.0
Ireland -0.6 -1.0 0.0 -0.8 -1.5
Netherlands 2.4 2.9 2.8 3.3 5.8
Portugal -8.4 -8.0 -0.9 -3.6 -6.7
Euro area 0.1 0.7 0.3 0.5 -0.2
UK -2.2 -1.6 -1.5 -2.0 -1.8
Sweden 4.4 5.3 7.5 8.2 7.1
Japan 2.1 2.8 3.2 3.7 3.4
USA -3.8 -4.5 -4.7 -5.7 -6.5
Table7: Current account balances as a percentage of GDP in Euro area countries and the USA, 
2001-2005
Source: OECD (2005).  
 
It would be highly desirable to have a closer look at the interaction between monetary and 
wage policies, on the one hand, and fiscal policy, on the other. However, such an analysis 
would be beyond the scope of this paper. Only a few, qualitative and preliminary remarks can 
be made at this stage. From the empirical indicators presented in Sections 4 and 5 it seems 
that fiscal policy did not play a decisive role in the explanation of macro-performance relative 
to the Euro area average for every country. For example, in the fast growing countries Ireland 
and Greece macro-economic conditions generated by wage and monetary policies were quite 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
8 See Hein/Truger (2006a) for a more extensive discussion.   18
favourable for above average growth rates. Likewise, in the slowly growing countries 
Germany, and to a lesser extent also Italy, the conditions generated by monetary and wage 
policies in themselves seem to have been adverse to growth. In the four countries just 
mentioned, therefore fiscal policy seems to have played the role of an additional factor 
amplifying the tendencies generated by the other policy areas. In Spain, the slightly restrictive 
effect of fiscal policy was too weak to compensate for the favourable growth conditions 
generated by monetary and wage policies. However, it seems that in the Netherlands and 
Portugal, where monetary and wage policies reactions were rather close to the Euro area 
average, fiscal policy turned the balance towards the below average growth performance. The 
same seems to hold for Finland’s above average growth. 
 
6. Improving fiscal policy within the EMU: Towards an expenditure path concept 
 
6.1 The 2005 reform 
In the light of these results, a reform of the SGP was inevitable. The recent reform in spring 
2005 means some important changes (European Council 2005). Alongside substantial 
modifications with respect to the medium term objectives, which permit some deviation from 
the ‘close to balance or in surplus rule’ depending on national circumstances, the application 
of the EDP has been reformed and softened to some extent: The Council has specified the 
‘relevant factors’ to determine whether a country exceeding the 3 percent limit ‘really’ has an 
excessive deficit. The previous exception of a severe economic downturn has been softened 
and it is now included an accumulated loss of output due to protracted very slow growth. The 
following types of spending may justify a temporary and small transgression of the deficit 
limit: spending on the Lisbon agenda, especially R&D and innovation policies, public 
investment, financial contributions to international solidarity and European unification as well 
as pension reforms. Debt sustainability is to be given greater relevance, too. Also the 
deadlines before identifying excessive deficits, taking action following a policy 
recommendation, and for the deficit to actually be corrected have all been extended. 
 
The reform has addressed one of the most obvious failings of the original SGP: Countries 
with difficulties in meeting the 3 percent ceiling or the close to balance medium-term target 
now have a range of possible factors that they can call upon to justify their inability to meet 
the targets. Some of the factors – debt sustainability or spending on the Lisbon agenda 
certainly make more sense from a macroeconomic point of view than others (pension reform).   19
Nevertheless, the reform has increased fiscal leeway for some countries to a certain extent. 
For example, Germany and France can avoid the immediate threat of penalties. However, the 
practical usefulness of the reform is limited. This has been demonstrated by the recent 
recommendations by the Commission and the decisions by the Council concerning the EDPs 
against Germany, Italy and Portugal.
9 In these cases both the Commission and the Council 
have taken a rather narrow view and do not even seem to concede the full leeway given by the 
reformed SGP. Despite the fact that the economic recovery is only weak and uncertain, a 
rather ambitious and risky consolidation path has been called for. 
 
Therefore, a more fundamental reform of the SGP is required. In what follows, we present an 
alternative coordination and consolidation concept based on expenditure paths that allows for 
coordinated fiscal policies across the Euro area in a counter-cyclical way, while at the same 




6.2 Expenditure paths for non-cyclical government spending  
We take as given that fiscal policy remains essentially a matter of national responsibility. The 
goal for national fiscal policy is having automatic stabilisers work – always under the 
constraint that for the individual countries a given medium term debt-GDP-ratio is not 
exceeded. Without such a limit, there may arise the ultimate danger of an ever accelerating 
government debt limiting the room of manoeuvre for public investment and other desirable 
government expenditure. Increasing public interest payments may also have serious regressive 
distributional effects with a negative impact on aggregate demand.  
 
To this end, the individual countries should establish expenditure paths for non-cyclical 
spending, which would be financed in the long term by tax revenue.
11 Cyclical spending 
should then be allowed to float freely around this target without being constrained by budget 
deficit limits. In this concept, governments can and should refrain from discretionary tax 
                                                           
9 For an up to date overview of the EDPs see the relevant internet pages of the European Commission under 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/about/activities/sgp/procedures_en.htm. 
10 Buti et al. (2003) give an overview of a series of reform approaches which for reasons of space cannot be 
discussed here. For an overview of the more recent debate on the SGP see Coeuré/Pisani-Ferry (2005) and 
Calmfors (2005).  
11 For the original proposal for the Euro area see Hein/Truger (2005d ). On similar proposals for Germany see 
Bartsch et al. (2002), Eicker-Wolf/Truger (2003) and Horn/Truger (2005). These proposals are based on the 
work of Horn/Scheremet (1999) who refer to the successful process of budget consolidation in the US during the 
1990s.    20
cuts/increases other than for purposes of changing the level of government spending. In a 
downturn, increases in expenditure and falls in revenue cause budget deficits which are 
financed by borrowing, thus increasing the level of debt. In an upturn, on the other hand, 
budget surpluses arise, which are used for consolidation purposes. If non-cyclical spending 
grows at a higher rate than long-term nominal GDP, the result is rising super-cyclical budget 
deficits. If it grows at a slower rate, structural deficits are reduced. Alignment of the 
expenditure path with a growth rate below the long- term nominal GDP path can therefore 
contribute to a revenue-side budget consolidation, if a structural deficit requiring 
consolidation existed at the outset. Therefore, countries exceeding their public debt target 
value should choose an expenditure growth rate slightly below nominal GDP trend growth, 
whereas others could let expenditure grow at the same rate as nominal trend GDP.
12 Of 
course, such values for the expenditure paths should be a matter for co-ordination between 
member countries. In addition, with a modernised stability pact there should be checks to 
ensure that individual countries comply with the prescribed expenditure paths for non-cyclical 
public spending. Moreover, the appropriateness of these expenditure paths themselves should 
also be subject to regular review, since the reference variable, i.e. the nominal potential GDP 
path, is liable to change as a result of public and private investment activity. 
 
In our view, the expenditure path concept has several advantages.
13 First, with respect to 
consolidation, the ultimate target value is the debt-GDP-ratio, which is much more directly 
relevant for fiscal sustainability than budget deficits. Second, the chosen variable, non-
cyclical government spending, is in fact under the government’s control, whereas the budget 
deficit is an endogenous variable of the whole macroeconomic process. Third, the expenditure 
path allows for automatic stabilisers to take effect. The adoption of pro-cyclical fiscal policies 
                                                           
12 Taking nominal GDP trend growth as a reference for non-cyclical spending may be problematic if there are 
large variations in the inflation rate. The trend may then be subject to frequent changes that do not reflect 
changes in the underlying real growth trend. Additionally, there might be an incentive for governments to inflate, 
in order to get more fiscal leeway. We are grateful to Joerg Bibow and Andrea Terzi for pointing out this latter 
possibility to us. Therefore, one might also use the real GDP trend plus the ECB’s target rate as a reference for 
the expenditure path. In order to simplify the exposition we refrain from doing so in the text. Nevertheless, we 
have included the real GDP trend plus the inflation target in Table 8. 
13 It has been argued that expenditure paths imply a very specific concept of the desirable public spending ratio 
and that they therefore restrict national governments’ room for manoeuvre (Buti et al. 2003a: 104). However, it 
should be pointed out that in the context of the concept presented here, first, the paths established are country-
specific. Second, the path approach does actually allow for changes in the public spending-GDP-ratio. In this 
case, however, an increase in this ratio would have to be financed by additional taxation. A reduction in the 
public spending-GDP-ratio would be possible by lowering the expenditure path and taxation. Although this 
could have the effect of increasing the average restrictiveness of fiscal policy, the adjustment would nevertheless 
be smoothed out and the automatic stabilisers would be able to continue operating in a somewhat weakened 
fashion around the lower path.   21
is prevented. Fourth, there is real coordination of fiscal policies within the Euro area, 
preventing free rider behaviour. Pressure from the European level might also help to enforce 
counter-cyclical fiscal policy on the level of the individual countries. Fifth, under the current 
macroeconomic regime dominated by monetary policy, macro-economically sensible and 
hence ‘credible’ rules for fiscal policy might also induce the ECB to cooperate. 
 
6.3 An adjusted expenditure path concept with a bit more discretion 
How would the Euro area and its member countries have fared in the period 2001 to 2005 
under the described expenditure path regime? As the concept relies completely on automatic 
stabilisers, one can use the results of the analysis of cyclical deficits from Table 5 as well as 
Figures 2 as a first approximation. If fiscal policy had been completely neutral, that would 
have meant a zero percentage point change in the cyclically adjusted budget deficits. 
Obviously, fiscal policy in Belgium, Spain, Austria, the Netherlands and Portugal could have 
been more expansive and hence less destabilising. As seen before, the latter three countries 
have been hurt particularly by the restrictive stance of their fiscal policies, and the latter two 
are also among the countries that were or still are subject to the excessive deficit procedure. 
On average all the other countries would have seen more restrictive fiscal policies under the 
expenditure path. For Greece this would have been desirable, because its fiscal policy was 
pro-cyclically expansive. For Italy, the same may be true, as the fiscal expansion occurred in 
2001 when the output gap was still improving, so that fiscal policy would have been slightly 
less restrictive during the slowdown from 2002 to 2005. Ireland and Finland would have been 
forced to refrain from their more or less successful discretionary counter-cyclical fiscal 
policies, which would certainly have reduced their above average growth substantially. From 
these countries’ point of view, this would have been regrettable, but from the point of view of 
decreasing economic divergence within the Euro area, it would have been welcomed – under 
the condition, of course, that the average level of growth attained by the macroeconomic 
policy mix in the Euro area is appropriate. The more problematic cases seem to be France and 
Germany. In both countries the substantial discretionary counter-cyclical fiscal expansions in 
the first years after the slowdown, would not have been possible under the conditions of an 
expenditure path. On the other hand, these countries would not have been forced into 
restriction in later years. At first sight the expenditure path would have been an improvement 
for many countries, but not for all, particularly not for France and Germany, two of the 
countries most in trouble with their excessive deficits. 











4.9 3.5 1.7 3.3 3.5 7.4 3.1 3.6 3.2 8.1 9.0 3.4 3.6
GDP trend* 5.2 4.0 2.2 3.8 4.5 7.4 3.5 3.8 5.6 8.5 13.3 5.6 6.4
real GDP trend* 
plus target inflation 
rate 




7.0 4.2 1.2 4.3 4.9 8.4 2.5 5.0 5.6 6.6 12.1 5.6 5.4
Government fixed 
capital formation 5.0 3.5 -4.2 4.3 8.2 9.5 -2.9 2.5 6.1 3.1 11.2 4.0 -1.6
Subsidies 6.1 1.7 -4.0 7.9 1.9 5.1 3.5 2.6 -0.1 1.4 4.7 1.8 10.4
Gross government 
interest payments -1.2 -1.4 -0.3 0.6 -1.7 -3.5 -1.0 -4.2 -6.7 -1.2 -2.1 -4.3 2.0
Social security benefits 
paid by government 7.3 4.0 2.5 3.8 4.4 7.0 4.0 4.7 4.2 9.4 14.8 3.7 8.7
Government total 
disbursements 6.3 3.7 1.4 4.1 4.0 7.1 2.2 3.6 4.4 6.1 11.5 5.3 5.4




2.7 2.5 1.5 3.2 2.5 3.5 1.1 1.7 2.9 3.7 3.9 3.3 3.3
Table 8: Nominal growth rates of GDP, trend GDP, selected categories of government expenditures and total revenue for the Euro area countries and the 
USA, average 2001-2005 in percent
Notes: *GDP trend: 6 year moving average of annual growth rates.
Source: EU-Commission (2005).  
 
However, this rather mixed evaluation changes considerably, if one takes a look not only at 
the development of structural deficits but also at the average growth rates of public 
expenditures and revenues (Table 8). If we take the growth rate of final government 
consumption as a proxy for non-cyclical expenditure, according to the expenditure path, final 
government consumption should grow in line with the nominal GDP trend (moving average 
of the growth rates of the past six years). The same applies for government investment and 
also subsidies. Government social benefits and interest payments may vary with cyclical 
fluctuations; the former can be expected to grow at a higher rate than nominal GDP trend 
during economic slowdowns and rising unemployment. In the absence of discretionary tax 
increases/tax cuts, public revenue should grow in line with actual nominal GDP. 
 
For the Euro area as a whole and for most of the countries, especially for Germany, public 
revenues grew at a rate significantly lower than actual nominal GDP. This is a strong 
indication, that there have been substantial discretionary tax cuts in many countries (for 
Germany: Truger/Jacoby 2004, Truger 2004). At the same time, for some of these countries, 
especially again for Germany, non-cyclical government expenditure, and in fact also total 
expenditure grew at a significantly lower rate than nominal trend GDP. Also quite strikingly, 
for some countries the growth rate of social benefits has been lower than could be expected 
from the extent of the economic slump. Therefore, in some countries a more expansive fiscal 
policy would have been achieved through a shift in the expenditure-/revenue mix. Most   23
importantly, less tax cuts in favour of higher expenditure growth would have been more in 
accordance with the expenditure path concept and could have had a positive macroeconomic 
effect, because expenditure multipliers are substantially higher than tax multipliers. In 
addition, a shift between different revenue categories might also have been conducive to 
growth. 
 
Nevertheless, under the conditions of an expenditure path the gain in terms of fiscal expansion 
relative to the status quo would certainly not have been very strong and it is doubtful, whether 
it would have been strong enough for a sustained economic recovery in the Euro area 
countries which were hit the hardest by the post-2000 slowdown. Even in the absence of 
reliable quantitative econometric results considerable doubts can be obtained by qualitative 
considerations. Taking the US economy as a benchmark, letting automatic stabilisers work 
would hardly have been sufficient for the Euro area to recover in a comparable way. As 
already demonstrated (Figure 3), US fiscal policy reacted in an aggressively discretionary 
counter-cyclical way against the slowdown, decreasing the CBR by more than 5 percentage 
points from 2000 to 2004. 
 
Two objections may be raised. First, automatic stabilisers in the USA are usually estimated to 
be considerably lower than in most European welfare states, so that relying on automatic 
stabilisers might nevertheless be sufficient in Europe. Second, it is well known that the US 
government reacted to a large part with aggressive tax cuts to the post-2000 slowdown, which 
may be rather ineffective due to low multipliers. However, both objections cannot change the 
basic conclusion. First, with respect to automatic stabilisers, the overall fiscal policy reaction 
in the USA was much more aggressive than anything that could have been achieved by 
automatic stabilisers in any Euro area country: The actual deficit in the USA was increased by 
6.6 percent of GDP from 2000 to 2003 in the face of a worsening of the output gap of 3.4 
percent of GDP, i.e. an increase of almost two percentage points per percentage point of 
decrease in the output gap. However, the usual estimates for automatic stabilisers in many 
European countries are somewhat higher than 0.5 percent (see e.g. van den Noord 2000). 
Additionally, one must take into account that many of the labour market reform strategies 
advocated by the European commission would actually lead to a considerable weakening of 
automatic stabilisers in Europe (Mabbett/Schelkle 2005). Second, with respect to tax cuts, 
although the Bush tax cuts played a very substantial role in the fiscal expansion in the USA 
the expenditure side was also much more expansive than its Euro area counterpart, with a   24
growth rate of government final consumption substantially above nominal GDP trend growth 
(Table 8). Moreover, fiscal policy has been much more expansive in the USA even though the 
Fed’s monetary policy was much more aggressive than the ECB’s reluctant and restrictive 
monetary policy (Section 5). Moreover, the ECB’s interest rate policy can only be oriented 
towards the economic situation in the Euro area as a whole. It cannot take into account the 
specific national economic circumstances of those countries which were hit especially by the 
post-2000-slowdown. Therefore, in the case of asymmetric shocks in a monetary union the 
case for discretionary national fiscal policy is on the agenda. 
 
Therefore, the expenditure path concept has to be modified in order to allow for stronger 
fiscal expansion during economic slowdowns and recessions. As one measure, for example, 
public investment above the level implied by the expenditure path could be allowed for. 
Additionally, discretionary increases in social benefits, other expenditure categories or 
perhaps also certain tax cuts might be applicable. All such transgressions of the path should, 
of course, be coordinated on a European level. In order to reconcile such periods of more 
aggressively expansionary discretionary fiscal policies with the goal of fiscal sustainability, 
the expenditure path for non-cyclical spending would have to be slightly below nominal trend 
GDP growth during ‘good times’ in order to allow for sufficient consolidation. 
 
Figure 5: Nominal GDP, nominal trend GDP, government expenditure and revenue: 
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Actually, this seems to have been exactly the strategy US fiscal policy has chosen (Figure 5). 
In the USA, non-cyclical government expenditure grew at a rate of about 3 percent from 1992 
until 1998, whereas the nominal GDP trend grew between 5 and 6 percent. During the 
persistent upswing with decreasing unemployment, the growth rate of social benefits declined. 
At the same time, tax revenues grew more than proportionately, as is to be expected in the 
absence of major tax cuts. The result was fiscal consolidation: By 1998 the government 
budget was in balance. After consolidation had been achieved, non-cyclical expenditure grew 
in line with nominal GDP trend until the slowdown in 2000/2001. Since then non-cyclical 
expenditure growth has been significantly accelerated. In addition, social benefits have been 
raised in a discretionary way and huge tax cuts have been implemented, thus exerting an 
enormous fiscal stimulus to the economy. Since 2004, well after the recovery had been 
achieved, tax revenues have been accelerating strongly again. At the same time the expansion 
of government expenditure has been decreased to a certain amount. It remains to be seen, 
whether fiscal policy in the USA will repeat its successful consolidation strategy of the 1990s.  
In striking contrast to the US experience, fiscal policy in the Euro area was much less 
systematic. (Figure 6) There is no systematic pattern in the development of government final 
consumption. Years with strong counter-cyclical restriction (1997) are followed by pro-
cyclical expansion (1999 and 2000), which in turn is followed by pro-cyclical restriction since 
2004. Revenue growth rates are subject to substantial variation which hints at intermittent 
hectic attempts of consolidation and stimulation. Therefore, Euro area fiscal policy could 
learn a lot from its US counterpart.  
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Figure 6: Nominal GDP, trend GDP, government expenditure and revenue: 
Euro area, 1992-2005, growth rates in %
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7. Can fiscal policy do the job under the current regime of monetary and wage policy? 
 
Switching from the current SGP to a suitable concept based on expenditure paths would 
substantially improve fiscal policy’s macroeconomic stabilisation role while at the same time 
not endangering the medium-term objective of fiscal sustainability. This result has been 
implicitly derived under the ceteris paribus assumption with respect to the other policy areas, 
monetary and wage policies. Unfortunately, however, it is highly probable that the advocated 
change in the fiscal policy regime would lead to reactions in the other areas. Under the current 
‘Maastricht regime’ dominating the Euro area, these reactions might worsen macroeconomic 
performance. In the end, isolated changes in fiscal policy institutions might not be sufficient.  
 
The switch to an adjusted expenditure path concept during the period from 2001 to 2005 
would have meant a more expansive fiscal policy both for the Euro area as a whole and for 
most of the individual countries. It is questionable, whether the ECB would have tolerated 
such a policy. As it is a strong defender of the SGP in the strictest possible form, it might 
even be that fiscal policy has already entered the ECB’s reaction function, so that it would 
have directly compensated a more expansive fiscal policy with a more restrictive monetary 
policy. Even in the absence of fiscal policy as an explicit argument in the ECB’s reaction 
function under the current un-coordinated state of wage policy within the Euro area countries,   27
a stronger fiscal expansion would have certainly led to an increase in wage growth. Given the 
ECB’s too ambitiously low inflation target, the ensuing inflationary tendencies or just the 
improvement in the output gap, would certainly have induced the ECB to raise interest rates, 
thereby worsening macroeconomic conditions all over the Euro area.
14 As a side effect, 
government debt and interest payments would have further risen, limiting fiscal leeway in the 
future. Therefore, a thorough change in the framework of fiscal policies in the Euro area 
might require a similarly thorough change in the framework of monetary and wage policies to 




Since the start of the European Monetary Union fiscal policy in the Euro area has been 
dominated by the SGP. Quite obviously the SGP has been unsuccessful in fulfilling its goals, 
fiscal sustainability and supporting economic growth. More and more countries have 
exceeded the 3 percent of GDP limit for the budget deficit and the public debt-GDP ratios 
have been growing, while at the same time macroeconomic performance has been 
unsatisfactory. It has been shown that, whereas US fiscal policy has acted in a strongly 
counter-cyclical way, stabilising the economy, in the Euro area fiscal policy has been much 
more restrictive and has had pro-cyclical and therefore destabilising effects for many 
countries. It has also been shown, that one cannot put all the blame on fiscal policy: The 
ECB’s restrictive monetary policy and divergent wage developments across the Euro area are 
at least as important as fiscal policy in the explanation of the Euro area’s weak economic 
performance. As a possible solution for the future we have suggested to replace the SGP by 
expenditure paths for non-cyclical spending as coordination tool, and we have discussed an 
important modification of the concept. Expenditure paths could co-ordinate fiscal policies 
within the Euro area in a counter-cyclical way and at the same time ensure fiscal 
sustainability. As the comparison with US fiscal policy suggested, the expenditure path 
should be set at a rate below nominal trend GDP with variations above trend allowed during 
economic downturns. Replacing the SGP with such an expenditure path concept would 
substantially contribute to a better macroeconomic performance within the Euro area. 
Unfortunately, as long as monetary and wage policies remain un-coordinated and 
destabilising any isolated improvements in fiscal policy might not be very effective in 
                                                           
14 For a recent empirical estimation of the ECB’s reaction function see Hein/Truger (2006b). Empirically there is 
no indication that the budget deficit has entered the ECB’s reaction function, however both the output gap, and   28
enhancing economic performance. Therefore, the key to improving the Euro area economy is 
to establish a regime of coordinated macroeconomic policy including fiscal as well as 
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